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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4) and Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) and Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in denying Big Bubba's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Certificate based solely on the length of time that had elapsed between 
service of the Amended Complaint and the filing of Big Bubba's Motion to Set 
Aside? (R. 52,72, 133, 197.) 
2. Did the district court err in denying Big Bubba's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Certificate without making findings of fact regarding the relevant factors to 
be considered in determining whether "good cause" exists under Rule 55(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? (R. 133, 197.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a default certificate involves 
the trial court's discretionary power and will be overturned only if it has abused its 
discretion. See Davis v. Goldsworthv. 2008 UT App 145,110, 184 P.3d 626. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
Plaintiff Mary Ann Jenkins, along with her husband, Gary D. Jenkins, 
filed this lawsuit seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in an 
accident involving one of Big Bubba's trailers. Plaintiff alleges that after 
removing a locking pin securing one of the trailer's two ramps in an upright 
position, the ramp fell and struck her on the head. There are no known witnesses 
to the accident and Plaintiff has given conflicting accounts to her medical 
providers as to how she was injured. Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit against Big 
Bubba's claiming that the trailer it manufactured was unreasonably dangerous. 
Plaintiff has also named as a defendant in the case the equipment rental company 
from which her husband rented the trailer, Advantage Rental, claiming that the 
trailer it rented was unreasonably dangerous. 
In July of 2009, Big Bubba's was served with a summons and a copy of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. At that time, Big Bubba's was in the process of 
moving its business to another location. Through the mistake and inadvertence of 
one of its employees, the summons and Amended Complaint were misplaced and 
forgotten. Unbeknownst to Big Bubba's, on October 27, 2009, a certificate of 
default was entered, signifying that Big Bubba's had failed to timely file an answer 
to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
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During the week of April 19, 2010, a representative of Advantage Rental 
contacted Big Bubba's and informed it that a default had been entered against it. 
Big Bubba's immediately notified its insurance agent and, by the end of that same 
week, counsel had been retained for Big Bubba's who filed both an answer to the 
Amended Complaint and a motion to set aside the default certificate. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On April 1, 2009, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Big Bubba's and 
Advantage Rental. (R. 1.) The next day, on April 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed an 
Amended Complaint. (R. 7.) On July 10, 2009, Big Bubba's was served with a 
summons and copy of the Amended Complaint. (R. 16.) On October 27, 2009, a 
Default Certificate was entered against Big Bubba's. (R. 32.) On April 23, 2010, 
counsel for Big Bubba's served Notice of Entry of Appearance, Answer to 
Amended Complaint, and Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate with supporting 
memorandum. (R. 37, 39, 50, 52, respectively.) 
After briefing on the motion was completed, the trial court heard oral 
argument on August 19, 2010. (R. 106.) Following oral argument, the trial court 
denied Big Bubba's Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate. (R. 133.) 
C« Disposition of the Court. 
On September 9, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying Big Bubba's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate. (R. 133.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Facts Asserted In Support Of Motion To Set Aside Default 
Certificate. 
1. On July 10, 2009, Big Bubba's was served with a summons and a 
copy of the Amended Complaint. (R. 16.) 
2. Days before, on July 1, 2009, Big Bubba's moved its business 
location from 123 W. 12th St. to 1751 W. 12th St., in Ogden, Utah. (R. 3, f 3.) 
3. Through the mistake and inadvertence of one of Big Bubba's 
employees, the summons and Amended Complaint were misplaced and forgotten. 
(R.3,14.) 
4. During the week of April 19, 2010, a representative of Advantage 
Rental contacted Big Bubba's and informed it that a default had been entered 
against it. (R. 3, f 5.) 
5. By the end of that same week, counsel for Big Bubba's had entered an 
appearance, filed an answer, and moved to have the certificate of default set aside. 
(R. 37, 39, 50, 52, respectively.) 
B. The Trial Court's Ruling On Big Bubba's Motion To Set Aside 
Default Certificate. 
6. On August 19, 2010, the trial court heard oral argument on Big 
Bubba's Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate. (R. 106, 197.) 
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7. In their briefing to the trial court, the parties' arguments focused on a 
dispute over the proper rule to be applied by the court in considering the motion; 
Big Bubba's argued that Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied, 
while Plaintiff argued that Rule 60(b) applied. (R. 63-64, 73-74.) 
8. During the hearing, the trial court agreed that Rule 55(c) was the 
applicable rule and acknowledged that the default certificate could be set aside for 
"good cause." (R. 197, pp. 5-7.) 
9. To determine whether there was "good cause," the trial court 
reviewed the factors set forth in Rule 60(b). (R. 197, pp. 6-7.) 
10. While acknowledging that the three (3) month time limit imposed 
under Rule 60(b) did not apply, the trial court held that too much time had elapsed 
between service of the Amended Complaint and the filing of Defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside to constitute "good cause" under Rule 55(c). (R. 197, pp. 24-25.) 
11. On September 9, 2010, the trial court entered an Order denying Big 
Bubba's Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate. (R. 133.) 
C. Additional Relevant Facts. 
12. While Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint that she was 
injured by a ramp from a Big Bubba's trailer that had fallen, striking her on the 
head, an Emergency Room report from McKay-Dee Hospital from the day of the 
alleged accident indicates that Plaintiff was seen for injuries secondary to a fall. 
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HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: The patient is a 49-
year-old female who has had some chronic back pain. She 
stood up, had back pain and then felt weak, fell forward, hit 
the right side of head. She now presents because she has had 
an increased amount of headache, confusion, and neck pain. 
Nothing seems to make it better or worse. 
(See McKay-Dee Hosp. Ctr., Emergency Dep't Report, April 2, 2007, attached as 
Ex. 10 to Pet. for Interlocutory Appeal.) 
13. While Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint that the trailer built 
by Big Bubba's was improperly manufactured/designed, Plaintiffs safety expert, 
F. David Pierce, has expressed no opinions that would support such allegations. 
(R. 179-80.) 
14. Around the same time as the hearing on Big Bubba's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Certificate, Plaintiff approached the defendants asking whether they 
would stipulate to amending the Scheduling Order so as to allow additional time 
for discovery. (R. 137.) The parties agreed and the trial court amended the 
Scheduling Order accordingly. (Id) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may set 
aside an entry of default for "good cause." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). Rule 55 
provides no test or formula for determining what constitutes "good cause." 
However, courts applying the federal counterpart of Rule 55 generally hold that 
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determining "good cause is a multifaceted an J case-specific inquiry. Factors 
often consider ed b) courts i ncl i ide \ v hethei the defai ill: "v\ as \ v iJ lful, w liethei the 
defendant has alleged a meritorious defense, and whether any preji idi.ee will result 
to the nondefaulting party if relief is granted. 
In this case, the trial court denied Big Bubba's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Certificate based solely on the amount of time that had passed since the service of 
the Amended Lomplamt, finding that a nint •' MOM;. ;j1ay wa^ - JI c:t. o 
constitute "good ca i ise " under R i i! e 55(c) . . • ,:\^ •. ,v- *i~ - : -o, 
the trial court's application of a x igid time-based test constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED BIG BUBBA'S MOTION BASED SOLELY ON THE 
AMOUNT OF TIME THAT HAD PASSED SINCF THE FILING 
OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
W hile a trial ecu irt ha s broad discretion n :i deciding whether to set aside a 
default, that discretion is not unlimited. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, [^ 9, 11 
P.3d 277. "As a threshold matter, a court's ruling must be 'based on adequate 
findings of fact ,::K: \ n :• ^ v^% id. (quoting May v. Thompson, 67'/ P.2d 1 I  (39, 
I I 10 • L tan * • -r , , . , - . . : . > -ki.ii... ,::• le of a default undei R ule 55(e) 
lies "vv ith in the sound discretion of the ti ial coi irt applying a sta ndard of liberality 
: n/so!vin.- ail doubts m favor of the defaulting party "" W:\icr \. Brocksmith, 
7 
825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
"A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes an 
abuse of discretion." Lund, 2000 UT 75,1 9, 11 P.3d 277; see also, Davis, 2008 
UT App 145,1j 11, 184 P.3d 626. 
Utah courts have long disfavored the entry of default against litigants 
because they are contrary to the purpose and intent of a system of adversarial 
litigation. See Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962); 
see also, McKean v. Mtn. View Mem. Estates, Inc., 411 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 
1966). It is the policy of the law to favor the resolution of disputed issues on 
substantial rather than technical grounds. See McKean, 411 P.2d at 130; see also 
Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D. Ford Contractors, Inc., 272 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 
1954). 
Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, like its federal counterpart, 
governs the setting aside of a default prior to the entry of judgment, and states that 
"for good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default." Miller, 825 
P.2d at 693 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c); Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c)). Since the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has encouraged the examination of cases 
decided under the federal rules in determining the meanings of the Utah rules. See 
Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 205, 207 (Utah 1953); see also Wilson v. 
8 
Lamber t , 613 P.2d 765, ' ; 6 7, n.2 ( [ ] 1 < ill 1980) ( recognizing the applicability of 
federal interpi etations of rules that are neai I;y identical to state rules). \S ; ith respect 
to R i ile 55(c) specifically , the ( Jtah Coi u t of Appea ls has stated, "[s]ince R i ile 
55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure are substant ively identical, 'we freely refer to authorities which 
have interpreted the federal r u l e / " Miller, 825 P.2d at 69? (quoting Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. A m . Barr ick Res . Corp. , > ; l^ :- .. N M :.:!• N ^ ). 
The "good cause" standard of Rule 55(c^ has been described as being a 
mutable one, varying from situation to situation. See Coon v. Grenier, 867 1.2d 
' 73 76 (1 st Cii ] 989) '"" It deri v es its si iapi * ;. \. i . >..c ' :v.»3arison 
w ith the more i igorous sta ndard applicable ' - * *r - * • <: ^ merits under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); the cgood cause' threshold for Rule 55(c) relief is lower, 
ergo more easily overcome, than that which obtains under Rule 60(b).'* Id., see 
also. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 763 F.2d i <*1. 1 a? f5tl i i; ^85) 
(explaining that although a motion to set aside a default under" R ule 55(c ) is 
somew hat analogous to a n lotion to set asi.de a j i ldgment i inder P ule 60( b), the 
standard for setting aside a default decree is less rigorous than setting aside a 
judgment for excusable neglect); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech 
Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, ^"5 n.6 (} Oil Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is well established that the 
good cause required by Fed. K.( iv.i* ^ I O I D : setting aside entry of acquit poses a 
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lesser standard for the defaulting party than the excusable neglect which must be 
shown for relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).") While it may be 
appropriate to consider the factors described in Rule 60(b) in determining whether 
"good cause" exists for setting aside a default certificate, see Miller, 825 P.2d at 
693, the standards are not the same. 
Rule 55(c) does not define "good cause." Nevertheless, courts applying 
Rule 55 have relied on multiple factors in determining whether "good cause" has 
been shown. Citing to federal appellate case law, this Court recently explained: 
Factors relevant to whether good cause has been shown could include 
[1] whether the default was willful, [2] whether the defendant alleges 
a meritorious defense, [3] whether the defendant acted expeditiously 
to correct the default, [4] whether setting the default aside would 
prejudice the plaintiff, and [5] the extent, if any, to which the public 
interest is implicated. 
Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, f 16, P.3d (citing Beitel v. OCA, Inc. (In 
re OCA, Inc.), 551 F.3d 359, 369 (5th Cir. 2008)) (brackets added).1 These factors 
are similar to the ones that have been applied by numerous other courts. See 
1
 The Roth decision was released on November 26, 2010, some three months after 
the trial court denied Big Bubba's Motion. In its Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order, Big Bubba's focused its discussion on the three factors it 
perceived to be the most commonly applied by the federal courts in determining 
"good cause." See Heber v. United States, 145 F.R.D. 576 (D. Utah 1992); see 
also. Hunt v. Ford Motor Co., 65 F.3d 178, *3 (10th Cir. 1995). Those three 
factors (willfulness, meritorious defenses, and prejudice) were presented to the trial 
court for consideration during the hearing on Big Bubba's Motion. (R. 197, p. 7.) 
Roth added two additional factors (expeditious corrective action and public 
interest). An analysis of all five factors is set forth below. 
10 
Marziliano v. Heckler. 728 F.2d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 1984); Meehan v. Snow, 652 
F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981): Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 
F.2d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Jackson v. bcc^ . c:< >• *•-• >- ^ - = 
1980); United Com Meter Co . Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R.. ""05 F.2d 839, 845 
(6th Cir. 1983); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d 
Cir. 1985); Coon, 867 F.2d at 76; CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 
F.2d 60, 64 f5th Cir. 1992): Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered v. Impenal Adjusters, 
Inc., 2;N i . - * . . „ , • . . raik \. Alien < > i. '• • • . .r. 
l l , s* - - ' " • v i nioup L-.le .i.-v iJiai; \. ;-.,.oci"^T. ^--• ; ' ' f ^ (9th 
('ir 20011; In re: CRS Steam. Inc.. 233 B.R. 901 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999); Heber v. 
United States, 145 F.R.D. 570 (D. Utah 1992). 
With respect to the denial of a motion to set aside default under Rule 55(c), 
the United States Court of Appeals lor I he first Circuit has stated, 
"notwithstanding the deference due to this - as other - discretionary decisions, . . . a 
reviewing tribunal should not stay its hand if the district court errs by reading 
'good cause' too grudgingly." See Coon, 867 F.2d at 76 (citing One Parcel of Real 
Prop., 763 F.2d at 183) (internal citations omitted). "Nor does 'an abuse of 
discretion need [to] be glaring to justify reversal '" Id. (quoting Keegel, 627 
F.2d at 373-74) (alterations in original). 
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Applying the above factors to this case5 it is apparent that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Big Bubba's Motion. 
1. Big Bubba's Failure To Timely Answer The 
Amended Complaint Was Not Willful. 
Willfulness in the context of a default refers to conduct that is more than 
merely negligent or careless. See SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 
1998). In this regard, courts will often ask whether the defendant's conduct is 
culpable. See TCI Group Life Ins., 244 F.3d at 697. 'The usual articulation of the 
governing standard, oft repeated in our cases, is that 'a defendant's conduct is 
culpable if he had received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the action 
and intentionally failed to answer.'" Id (emphasis in original; internal citations 
omitted). "Willful and bad faith conduct is conduct characterized by incessant and 
flagrant disrespect for court rules, deliberate and knowing disregard for judicial 
authority, or intentional non-responsiveness." Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. 
Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So.2d 600, 608 (Ala. 1988). "Such conduct justifies a 
finding of culpability and thus militates against an exercise of discretion in favor of 
the defaulting party." Id "However, a defaulting party's reasonable explanation 
for inaction and non-compliance may preclude a finding of culpability." Id 
In this case, Big Bubba's did not willfully fail to answer the Amended 
Complaint. As previously set forth, Big Bubba's was served with the summons 
and a copy of the Amended Complaint at the same time it was moving the location 
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of its business. Through the mistake and inadvertence v>; OWQ OI US emp.oyees, the 
summons and Amended Complaint vv ere m isplaced and forgotten It w as not i intil 
Big Biibba's was notified b> a representati\ e of < \ d\ antage Rental that it realized 
its mistake. Once the mistake was realized, Big Bubba's took immediate action by 
answering the Amended Complaint and moving to have the default set aside. 
Plaintiff never challenged, and the trial corrt never questioned, Big 
Bubba's explanation for the defaul .e iru' conrt made M : :;:*. dings of fact that 
would s uppori nr e\cn sug;:^; IM; h.. iv. >i - . \: .: -.- ,:; •. r.ng other than an 
h o n e s ! imsUilc In Ltd • ' . v ^ r - H .^ Bubba's explanation and 
specifically incorporated the same as a finding of laci in its Order. (R. 133.) 
Under the circumstances, Big Bubba's default cannot be considered willful. 
2. Big Bubba's Has Alleged Meritorious Defenses. 
A meritorious defense means a defense worthv of prc^cm^ 
- Vv.r^j]:!'. .-..-. /•. - : .\-,. See Hen era v. Springe 1 I u.; * ,v " * i 
;
 ^
;
. - •'- M ' ' x; ; y/3;, an "a 111 lelevant part, rev" a in pan, 5xU x\Ld 
1072 (N.M. 1973). "The 'meritorious defense' component ol the test for setting 
aside a default does not go MI fir J- to require that the movant demonstrate a 
likelihood of success ^n *he mcru.v L^ii* ^67 F.2d at /'" / (quoting KeegeL ol~ 
F 2d at 374) "Rathei , a part> 's av erments need onl> plai isibK s iigg, * 
existence effects w hicli, if pro\ en at trial, "\ v oi ild con stit i ite a cognizable defense." 
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Id.; see also, Kryzak v. Dresser Indus.. 118 F.R.D. 12, 14 (D. Me. 1987) 
(recognizing both compliance with industry standards and comparative negligence 
as meritorious defenses). 
In this case, Big Bubba's alleged meritorious defenses in its Answer. 
Among others, Big Bubba's alleged that Plaintiffs injuries were not proximately 
caused by any act or omission by Big Bubba's; that Plaintiffs own negligence or 
fault was the proximate cause of her injuries and damages; that Plaintiffs own 
negligence or fault exceeds the fault of the defendants; and, that the trailer was 
built in accordance with industry standards and is presumed to not be defective 
under Utah law. (R. 43-48.) In fact, while Plaintiff alleges in her Amended 
Complaint that the trailer built by Big Bubba's was improperly 
manufactured/designed, Plaintiffs own safety expert, F. David Pierce, has 
expressed no opinions that would support such allegations. (R. 179-80.) 
In this case, it is critical that Big Bubba's be allowed to defend itself on 
the merits, especially because Plaintiff has given conflicting and contradictory 
accounts of how she was injured. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged: 
On or about April 2, 2007, Plaintiff, MARY ANN JENKINS 
attempted to lower the ramp by pulling the locking pin, 
wherein the ramp immediately fell and struck her on the head, 
knocking her unconscious onto the ground. 
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(R. 8,, % 9 ) However, an Emergency Room report from McKay-i )o. Hospital from 
that day indicates Plaintiff was seen foi injuries secondary to a fall ' I he report 
states: 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: The patient is a ^• 
year-uA! lomal./ w)..> : ^  \.M some chronic back pain. She 
stood up, nad -\ick pain a:u: then felt weak, fell forward. ;L; 
the right side of head. She now presents because she ha^> had 
an increased amount of headache, confusion, nnn nee1: r-nr 
Nothing seems to make it better or wrorse. 
(McKay-Dee Hosp. Ctr., Emergency Dep't Report, April 2, 2007, attached as Ex. 
10 to Pet. for Interlocutory Appeal.) 
All that is necessary to satisfy the "meritorious defense" requirement is 
that the defendant allege sufficient farts .„.. - - . ; .*- .>: -. ..te a defense. 
See KeegeL " *\ . ,..r • ,. *• d.i; ' - • ega tions are 
meritorious if they contain "even a hint of a suggestion" which, if proven at trial, 
would constitute a complete defense); see also, TCI Group Life Ins., 244 F.3d at 
700 (stating that "the question whether the factual allegation [is] true" is not to be 
determined b> the court when it decides a motion to set aside detail a Clearly, 
Big Biibba's has alleged meritorious defenses, and the ti ial com t made no findings 
to suggest otherwise (R 133.) 
15 
3. Big Bubba's Acted Expeditiously To Correct 
The Default. 
The third factor, "whether the defendant acted expeditiously to correct 
the default," is one that appears to have received little individual analysis from 
appellate courts. Nevertheless, a practical and commonsense application of this 
factor demonstrates that this too supports setting aside the default against Big 
Bubba's. 
The Default Certificate in this case was signed October 27, 2009. (R. 
32.) Plaintiff never notified Big Bubba's that a default had been entered against it. 
Instead, it was the co-defendant, Advantage Rental, who contacted Big Bubba's 
and informed it of the default. (R. 134, f 6.) Big Bubba's received notice of the 
default from Advantage Rental during the week of April 19, 2010. (See id.) 
Immediately, Big Bubba's contacted its insurance agent and, by the end of that 
same week, on April 23, 2010, counsel was retained and filed Big Bubba's Answer 
and Motion to Set Aside Certificate of Default with the trial court. (R. 134, f 7.) 
While it is true that nearly six months had passed between the time the 
default was entered and the time Big Bubba's filed its motion to set the default 
aside, the question of whether Big Bubba's acted expeditiously to correct the 
default must be decided by looking to when Big Bubba's received notice of the 
default. Because it is undisputed that Big Bubba's took immediate action to 
correct the default as soon as it received notice that a default had been entered, Big 
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Bubba's acted expeditiously. See Menzie v. Galetka, 2006 I IT 81, 1 69, 150 I \3d 
4N(l (holding (hat even though sixlevu months had passed before the defendant 
filed a memorandum in snppoit of his dO(ht motion defendant's motion was 
timely under the circumstances where defendant was unaware of his prior 
counsel's failure to file the memorandum inc! \ ^ I:.-A counsel took prompt 
corrective action). 
4. Plaintiff Will Not Be Prejudiced If The Default 
Is Set Aside. 
Federal eourts construing this requirement suggest that the prejudice to 
the nondefaulting must be substantial to justify the denial of a motion to set aside a 
default. See United Coin, 705 F.2d at 845 ("Mere delay in satisfying a plaintiffs 
claim, if it should succeed at trial, is not sufficient prejudice to require aeniai H a 
motion to set aside a default judgment,' '); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, Id I M 
Da\is v. Music:'. ~!3 f.Jd 9U/, yio yld Cn. i^bSj ^holding that deiay alone is 
insufficient; delay must result in loss of evidence, create increased difficulties of 
discovery, or provide greater opportunity for fraud). 
In this case, Plaintiff would suffer no substantial prejudice if the default 
certificate is set aside. In \\> nieniorafuiuni opposing Big Bubba's Molinu, Plaintiff 
made no clain I of preji idi.ee whatsoe^ - er ("R 63-64 ) E)t i i ing oral argument on Big 
Bubba's Motion, Plaintiff argued that she would be prejudiced in two ways if the 
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default was set aside, first, by having to establish liability, and second, by delay. 
(R. 197, pp. 19-20.) The trial court made no findings that Plaintiff would suffer 
any prejudice if the default was set aside (R. 133-34), nor could it under the facts 
of this case. 
With respect to Plaintiffs first argument, the federal courts have 
explained that setting aside a default and requiring a party to litigate does not 
amount to prejudice. See One Parcel of Real Prop., 763 F.2d at 183 (stating that 
"requiring] the [plaintiff] to litigate the action is insufficient prejudice to require 
the default decree to stand"); see also, Coon, 867 F.2d at 77; Robinson v. Griffith, 
108 F.R.D. 152, 156 (W.D. La. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff 
would be prejudiced by the setting aside of the default and stating "[a] party who 
requests a judgment by default is not entitled to one as a matter of right"); Heller v. 
Tex. Real Estate Common (In re Marinez), 589 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2009) 
("There is no prejudice to the plaintiff where the setting aside of the default has 
done no harm to plaintiff except to require [him] to prove [his] case.") (brackets 
original; additional citations omitted). 
Concerning Plaintiffs second argument, while mere delay is insufficient 
to establish prejudice, see United Coin, 705 F.2d at 845, this case is unique in that 
there would be no delay at all if the default was set aside. Despite Big Bubba's 
absence, this case has been in active litigation since Plaintiff filed her Amended 
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Complaint. Defendant Advantage Rental has conducted discovery by gathering 
records and taking depositions, and Big Bubba's has no intention of duplicating 
these efforts. This point was made by Big Bubba's during oral argument to the 
trial court. (R. 197, p. 21.) Ironically, at the same time as the hearing on Big 
Bubba's Motion, Plaintiff approached the defendants asking whether they would 
stipulate to amending the Scheduling Order so as to allow additional time for 
discovery. (R. 137.) Big Bubba's and Advantage Rental both agreed to the 
amendment and the parties are currently moving forward to complete expert 
discovery, albeit with some uncertainty as to the scope of Big Bubba's 
participation in the same. Clearly, Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice if the default 
against Big Bubba's is set aside. 
5. The Public Interest Supports Setting Aside The 
Default In This Case. 
A default certificate is "a first step" towards obtaining a default 
judgment. Roth v. Joseph, 2010 UT App 332, f 17, P.3d (quoting Davis 
v. Goldsworthv (Davis II). 2010 UT App 78, If 10 n.4, 233 P.3d 496). Under Utah 
law, judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the interest 
of justice and fair play. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 
(Utah 1962). 'The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every 
case." Id "The striking of pleadings, entering of default, and rendering of 
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judgment against a disobedient party are the most severe of the potential sanctions 
that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party." Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 12 (Utah 1995). 
In this case, the public interest favors setting aside the default certificate 
and allowing Big Bubba's to litigate this case on the merits. If not overturned, a 
default judgment will eventually be entered against Big Bubba's - the most severe 
sanction recognized in civil litigation. Big Bubba's understands and appreciates 
the need for trial courts to be able to manage busy calendars and enforce 
compliance with rules intended to ensure orderly judicial administration, but for 
the trial court to have denied Big Bubba's Motion without even considering a less 
harsh alternative was clearly erroneous. See Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 15 ("When 
the sanction imposed is that of a default judgment, the most severe of sanctions, 
the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow than when the court is imposing 
less severe sanctions."); Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277 ("While courts are entitled to 
enforce compliance with the time limits of the Rules by various means, the 
extreme sanction of a default judgment must remain a weapon of last, rather than 
first, resort."); see also, Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Dismissal 
is a harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations.") 
Respectfully, Big Bubba's submits that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it failed to adequately consider or apply the appropriate factors 
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underlying the "good cause" standard of Rule 55(c). Instead, the trial court simply 
found that the nine (9) month delay in answering the Amended Complaint "was too 
lengthy to be considered good cause under Rule 55(c)." (R. 197, p. 25.) The trial 
court made no other findings in support of its decision. (R. 197.) Had the trial 
court focused on the appropriate factors, as set forth above, it would have found 
that "good cause" exists for setting aside the default certificate in this case. 
Even without having applied the factors analyzed above, the trial court 
expressed that whether to set aside the default in this case was a "close call." (R. 
197, p. 23.) Under both Utah and federal case law applying Rule 55(c), the trial 
court was to resolve all doubts in favor of Big Bubba's. See Miller, 825 P.2d at 
693 ("The setting aside of a default under Rule 55(c) lies within 'the sound 
discretion of the trial court, applying a standard of liberality and resolving all 
doubts in favor of the defaulting party.'") (internal citations omitted); see also, 
Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 96 ("[BJecause defaults are generally disfavored and are 
reserved for rare occasions, when doubt exists as to whether a default should be 
granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party.") 
In this case, it is clear the trial court did not resolve all doubts in favor of Big 
Bubba's. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL LEAD TO 
CONFUSION AND CREATE A RISK OF INCONSISTENT 
JUDGMENTS. 
Based on the trial court's decision denying the motion to set aside the default 
certificate, liability against Big Bubba's is now established; the only issue yet to be 
decided is damages. This presents a host of complications and unintended 
consequences. The Amended Complaint asserts claims against Big Bubba's 
alleging that the trailer it manufactured was unreasonably dangerous. (R. 10.) The 
Amended Complaint also asserts claims against the co-defendant, Advantage 
Rental, alleging that it rented an unreasonably dangerous trailer, something 
Advantage Rental has denied. (R. 9, 18, respectively.) If liability is now 
established against Big Bubba's, then the jury will not likely understand that 
Plaintiff must still prove the trailer was unreasonably dangerous as to Advantage 
Rental. Having liability established against one defendant, where there are two 
defendants facing liability under the same general theory, will cause confusion, 
uncertainty, and potentially inconsistent verdicts. This is a legitimate concern in 
cases involving multiple defendants and has even led some federal courts to hold 
that a default judgment cannot be entered against one defendant if it would be 
inherently inconsistent with a judgment entered against a similarly situated co-
defendant. See e ^ , Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872). 
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In Prow, the United States Supreme Court explained that when one of 
several defendants who is alleged to be jointly liable defaults, judgment should not 
be entered against that defendant until the matter has been adjudicated with regard 
to all defendants or all defendants have defaulted. 82 U.S. at 554. The Court 
stated: 
If the court in such a case as this can lawfully make a final decree 
against one defendant separately, on the merits, while the cause was 
proceeding undetermined against the others, then this absurdity might 
follow: there might be one decree of the court sustaining the charge of 
joint fraud committed by the defendants; and another decree 
disaffirming the said charge, and declaring it to be entirely unfounded, 
and dismissing the complainant's bill. And such an incongruity, it 
seems, did actually occur in this case. Such a state of things is 
unseemly and absurd, as well as unauthorized by law. 
Id. This rule has been subsequently extended and applied to defendants who have 
closely related defenses. See Wright, Miller & Kane § 2690 at 75. See also, Gulf 
Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps.. Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir. 
1984) (vacating default judgment against exporter because plaintiff failed on its 
related claims against importer); In re First T.D. & Invest., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 531-
32 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[i]t would likewise be incongruous and unfair to 
allow the Trustee to prevail against Defaulting Defendants on a legal theory 
rejected by the bankruptcy court with regard to the Answering Defendants in the 
same action"). 
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In this case, setting aside the default and allowing Big Bubba's to defend 
itself against Plaintiffs claims together with Advantage Rental will prevent 
confusion and will eliminate the risk of inconsistent verdicts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Big Bubba's respectfully requests that the 
decision of the trial court denying its Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate be 
reversed. 
DATED this Z / day of January, 2011. 
STRONG & HANNI 
AndrgjyJX Wrigl 
A. Joseph Sano 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Big Bubba 's Trailers 
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Deven J. Coggins ( ) 
Addison D. Larreau ( ) 
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Tab A 
W.Scott Lythgoe, UBN 7928 
Deven J. Coggins, UBN 7703 
Addison D. Larreau, UBN 8546 
COGGINS, LARREAU & LYTHGOE, P.C. 
289 24th Street, Suite 150 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 393-5555 
Facsimile: (801) 392-1637 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401 
MARY ANN JENKINS and GARY D. 
JENKINS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
1 vs. 
ADVANTAGE PAWN RENTAL, dba ADVANTAGE RENTAL, and/or 
ADVANTAGE RENTAL & TRADING 
POST, and BIG BUBBA'S TRAILER 
MFG., dba BIG BUBBA'S TRAILER 
SALES and/or BIG BUBBA'S TRAILER 
SALES & MFG., and JOHN DOES I-IV, 
Defendant. 
i 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S, BIG 
BUBBA'S TRAILER MFG, MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
Case No.: 090902023 
Judge: Michael Direda 
THE COURT, having considered Defendant's, Big Bubba's Mfg, ("Defendant") Motion 
to Set Aside Default Certificate on August 19th, 2010, having reviewed the pleadings filed by the 
parties, heard their oral arguments, having considered additional case law, and for good cause 
shown, now makes the following findings: 
1. U.RXiv.P. 55(c) is the deteiminative rule and standard and that Defendant must show 
good cause for the court to set aside an entry of default. 
ipin err; _n DM -• 
Lull} ZLl J \ It *** J 
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2. The court used U.R.Civ.P 60(b) for guidance to determine "good cause'*, which the 
court considered, and Defendant argued, to be excusable neglect. 
3. Plaintiffs properly served a summons and complaint upon Defendant on July 10th, 
2009, during a time that Defendant was in the process of changing its business location. 
4. Through the mistake and inadvertence of one of Defendant's employees, the summons 
and amended complaint were misplaced and forgotten. 
5. On October 27, 2009, Plaintiff obtained a Default Certificate from the court's clerk. 
6. During the week of April 19, 2010, Defendant Advantage Pawn Rental notified 
Defendant Big Bubba's that a default certificate had been entered against it. 
7. By the end of the week, on April 23, 2010, counsel had been retained to represent 
Defendant Big Bubba's, and an Answer and Motion to Set Aside Certificate of Default 
was filed with the court. 
8. Defendant's answer was filed nine months after Defendant had been served. 
9. Defendant's affidavit establishes that it failed to answer Plaintiffs' complaint for nine 
months because the summons and complaint was lost during Defendant's business 
relocation. 
NOW HAVING MADE THE PREVIOUS FINDINGS, ihe Court makes the following 
ruling: 
1. Based upon Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable case law, notably Miller v. 
Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah App. 1992), Defendant has failed to show sufficient 
grounds to establish good cause or excusable neglect for filing its answer to Plaintiffs complaint 
nine (9) months after service. 
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THEREFORE, THE ORDER OF THIS COURT denies Defendant's motion to set aside 
Plaintiffs default certificate. 
DATEI 
: Q 
iD this _J_ day of August, 2010. 
•APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAEL DIREDA 
Second District Court Judge 
Page 3 of 4 
M < , . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th.is.3jP_ day ofJafy 20 iO, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order on Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate to the following: 
Andrew D. Wright 
A. Joseph Sano 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Attorney for Defendant Big Bubba's Trailer Sales, Inc. 
Telephone: 801-532-7080 
Facsimile: 801-596-1508 
Dale J. Lambert 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant Advantage Pawn 
Telephone: 801-355-3431 
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